

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

15 April 1959

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. **28**  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.  
FULLY CLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS, S, C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: **2010**

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt


Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 April 1959


## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC




USSR-Poland: Commenting on the recent party congress in Warsaw, [redacted]

[redacted] stated that Khrushchev's grudging endorsement of both Gomulka and Poland's special brand of Communism is, in time, bound to have an impact on Communists throughout the world. Moscow may be faced eventually with the alternative of crushing Gomulka or permitting other satellites the same degree of autonomy as Poland, which would weaken Soviet control.



Communist China - Tibet - India: Peiping's statements and dealings with India have been increasingly cautious since the Tibet revolt started last month. Communist China has thus far made no formal protest concerning Indian Government statements critical of the Communist handling of the revolt. Reflecting this policy, [redacted]



25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

**III. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE  
ON BERLIN SITUATION**

[The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that estimate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):]

[1. Evidence of preparations for evacuation of Soviet control elements from Berlin continues to mount. While the USSR will not turn over access controls to the GDR in the near future, the physical transfer of access controls could be accomplished with little or no advance warning.]

[2. There are no reliable indications of a bloc intent in the near future to blockade Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin from the bloc. However, the USSR could take such actions with little or no warning. The recent completion of new facilities at the Marienborn checkpoint suggests that the East Germans may impose tighter controls on railroad traffic between West Germany and Berlin.]

OK

[3. There are as yet no clear indications of specific Soviet tactics at the forthcoming foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva. Moscow is using propaganda media and covert channels to play down East-West tensions and attempt to soften Western positions on the basic issues involved.]

[4. It is still too early to determine what effect, if any, Chancellor Adenauer's decision to seek the presidency will have on Bonn's foreign policy.]

[5. Tension throughout West Berlin has noticeably abated and the upward trend of the stock market is a significant indicator of confidence. There is still considerable apprehension about the confusion surrounding international debate on Berlin and all-German problems. Most West Berlin political leaders prefer the status quo despite its weaknesses to any compromise.]

25X1

15 Apr 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

25X1

25X1 [redacted] 1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

25X1 [redacted]  
Possible Impact on the Bloc of Khrushchev's Endorsement  
Of Gomulka

25X1 [redacted]  
25X1 [redacted] Khrushchev's grudging endorsement of  
Gomulka and Poland's own special brand of Communism is  
bound in time to have its impact on the Communist world. In  
the long run, Moscow may be faced with the alternatives of  
having to crush Gomulka or of permitting certain other satel-  
lites a degree of autonomy which would weaken its control.

25X1 [redacted] The truce between Khrushchev and Gomulka is based on  
mutual necessity, [redacted] As a Commu-  
nist, Gomulka, in the final analysis, can look only to Moscow  
for support and dares not defy the USSR openly. On the other  
hand, trouble in Poland could mean only trouble for Khrushchev,  
who does not want to risk another Hungary while he is so deeply  
involved in important international political maneuverings.

25X1 [redacted] Concern over the possible effect of the outcome of the Ber-  
lin crisis on Poland's unique position in the bloc has been ex-  
pressed [redacted]

[redacted] feels that if the United States  
makes too many concessions to the Soviet Union in the current  
crisis over Berlin, the USSR would regard its dominance in East-  
ern Europe as assured and would no longer feel it necessary to  
tolerate the Polish differences. As long as there is some un-  
certainty in the USSR about the American attitude toward East-  
ern Europe, it will maintain the status quo in Poland and in some  
of the other countries.

25X1 [redacted] Currently many Poles, including Gomulka, [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] are concerned that the Soviet Union, despite Khrush-  
chev's assurances to the contrary, will make "territorial ad-  
justments," stripping Poland of its highly prized western territo-  
ries in order to effect a German settlement. While Poland would  
prefer the Oder-Neisse border to be established for good, it fears  
the possible results of negotiations over Germany and will settle  
for a continuation of the status quo. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

# **THE PRESIDENT**

## **The Vice President**

### **Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs  
 Scientific Adviser to the President  
 Director of the Budget  
 Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization  
 Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination  
 Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities  
 Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy  
 Executive Secretary, National Security Council

### **The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

### **The Department of State**

The Secretary of State  
 The Under Secretary of State  
 The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs  
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
 The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration  
 The Counselor  
 Director, International Cooperation Administration  
 The Director of Intelligence and Research

### **The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense  
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
 The Secretary of the Army  
 The Secretary of the Navy  
 The Secretary of the Air Force  
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
 The Director, The Joint Staff  
 Chief of Staff, United States Army  
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy  
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
 Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations  
 Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army  
 Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force  
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
 Commander in Chief, Pacific

### **The Department of the Interior**

The Secretary of the Interior

### **The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

### **Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

### **Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

### **National Security Agency**

The Director

### **National Intelligence Center**

The Director

### **United States Information Agency**

The Director

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2



Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2005/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004400280001-2

**TOP SECRET**